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As a comparatively cost effective, clean, and safe method of transportation, international shipping offers
an important means of moving goods internationally and enables other activities such as leisure
cruising.1 Many factors contribute to the development of international shipping. As an example, the
evolution of ship propulsion has progressed from sailing ships to steam ships powered by coal and then
to an almost universal use of diesel engines, significantly accelerating international trade.2 Similarly,
advances in telecommunication and information and communications technology infrastructure,
reductions in trade barriers, and low energy costs have also contributed to the expansion of international
shipping and seaborne trade.3 However, the increase in fuel consumption associated with increasing
seaborne trade has led to a rise in atmospheric emissions from international shipping.
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The Challenge of Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions from
International Shipping: Assessing the International Maritime
Organization’s Regulatory Response
Yubing Shi

I. INTRODUCTION

As a comparatively cost effective, clean, and safe method of transportation, international
shipping offers an important means of moving goods internationally and enables other
activities such as leisure cruising.1 Many factors contribute to the development of
international shipping. As an example, the evolution of ship propulsion has progressed from
sailing ships to steam ships powered by coal and then to an almost universal use of diesel
engines, significantly accelerating international trade.2 Similarly, advances in
telecommunication and information and communications technology infrastructure,
reductions in trade barriers, and low energy costs have also contributed to the expansion of
international shipping and seaborne trade.3 However, the increase in fuel consumption
associated with increasing seaborne trade has led to a rise in atmospheric emissions from
international shipping.
Emissions from international shipping, in particular greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions,
have contributed to climate change. The 2007 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s
fourth assessment report states that ‘most of the observed increase in global average
temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in

The author would like to thank Robin Warner and Warwick Gullett for their valuable
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content of the article.
1
International Maritime Organization (IMO), Introduction to IMO
<http://www.imo.org/About/Pages/Default.aspx>; see also Rajiv Saxena, Overseas
Shipping Made Cheaper 42(7) Industrial Engineer 24 (2010). But see Matthew
Stibbe, Shipping Security: All at Sea? 3(2) Infosecurity Today 32 (2006). Stibbe
asserts that marine terrorism makes the shipping costly.
2
Sujith Kollamthodi et al, Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Shipping: Trends, Projections
and Abatement Potential: Final Report, at 3 (2008).
3
Ibid.
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anthropogenic GHG concentrations.’4 Global warming serves as the main manifestation of
climate change. It is axiomatic that GHG emissions are one of the main contributions to
global climate change.
Currently, seven types of GHGs are listed in the Kyoto Protocol to the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), namely carbon dioxide, methane,
nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons (HFC), perfluorocarbons (PFC), sulphur hexafluoride, and
nitrogen trifluoride.5 The GHG emissions from international shipping mainly constitute
carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and HFC.6 Their total amount has been increasing
too rapidly in recent years to be ignored. The International Maritime Organization’s (IMO)
second study on GHGs in 2009 states that in 2007 carbon dioxide emissions from
international shipping reached 870 million tonnes, which covers 2.7 percent of the global
emissions of carbon dioxide.7 Furthermore, mid-range emission scenarios indicate that by
2050, if no aggressive emission-reduction strategies are introduced,8 carbon dioxide
emissions from international shipping may grow by a factor of two to three (compared with
the emissions in 2007) due to the growth in shipping.9 These statistics and scenarios show
that the increasing trend of GHG emissions from international shipping will be maintained in
the long term and should be recognized as a growing problem among scientists, industry, and
environmental policy makers.

4

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Fourth Assessment Report, Synthesis
Report, 36 (2007),
<http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/contents.html>.
5
Kyoto Protocol, 37 ILM 32 (1998), Annex A. UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change, 31 ILM 849 (1992) [UNFCCC]. The 1998 Kyoto Protocol only lists six types
of GHGs, but a seventh type of GHG, nitrogen trifluoride, was added to the category
in the Doha Climate Change Conference in 2012. Doha Amendment to the Kyoto
Protocol, Decision 1/CMP.8, C.N.718.2012.TREATIES-XXVII.7.c (8 December
2012) (not yet in force).
6
O Buhaug et al, Second IMO GHG Study 2009, Executive summary, 3 (2009).
7
Ibid. These data have been criticized since they do not take account of the global economic
downturn since 2009. To provide a better foundation for IMO’s future work, an
update of the 2009 IMO study of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions estimate from
international shipping is currently being carried out, and the final report is expected to
be submitted to the IMO in 2014. Report of the Expert Workshop on the Update of
GHG Emissions Estimate for International Shipping (Update-EW), note by the
Secretariat, MEPC 65th Session, Agenda Item 5, Doc MEPC 65/5/2 (4 March 2013).
8
Ibid; N Nakicenovic et al, Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (2000). The scenarios are
primarily based on assumptions of global development in the International Panel on
Climate Change’s (IPCC) Special Report on Emissions Scenarios storylines.
9
Buhaug et al, supra note 6 at 1.
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The problem of GHG emissions from international shipping is an issue of
international dimension. To unite the international community in addressing this issue jointly,
the United Nations has made active institutional and legal responses. The UNFCCC and its
Kyoto Protocol, together with its Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technological Advice
(SBSTA), the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA),
Conference of the Parties (COP), and the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of
the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP), have contributed to the international attempts to
address the issue, although the effectiveness of their efforts has been questioned.10 As a
consequence, GHG emissions from international shipping are not regulated by the UNFCCC
and its Kyoto Protocol.11
As a specialized agency of the United Nations, the IMO has recognized the problem
of GHG emissions from ships and has acted on it based on Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol
as well as on the Convention on the International Maritime Organization (IMO Convention)
and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).12 In contrast to the
efforts made within the UN international climate change regime, there are high expectations
of the IMO due to its mandate and strength in regulating GHG emission-related technical
matters. In particular, the newly adopted revised Annex VI of the International Convention
for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL Convention)13 and the guidelines
10

See, eg, Sebastian Oberthür, Institutional Interaction to Address Greenhouse Gas
Emissions from International Transport: ICAO, IMO and the Kyoto Protocol 3(3)
Climate Policy 191, 193 (2003). Oberthür asserts that parties to the UNFCCC had
wide discussions on the GHG emissions from international transport, and its SBSTA
has been working on marine bunker fuels. However, under the UNFCCC process, no
regulation on shipping GHGs has been achieved. However, see, Bernd Hackmann,
Analysis of the Governance Architecture to Regulate GHG emissions from
International Shipping 12(1) Int’l Envt’l Agreements: Politics, Law & Economics 85,
90 (2012). Hackmann claims that the work by the UNFCCC on the issue is still
proceeding, and regulating shipping GHG emissions should fall under the scope of the
Bali Action Plan.
11
The UNFCCC only requires the regulation of national reduction of GHG emissions from
ships, while the Kyoto Protocol requires the IMO to regulate GHG emissions from
international shipping. UNFCCC, supra note 5, Article 4(1)(c); Kyoto Protocol, supra
note 5, Article 2(2).
12
A detailed discussion on this issue is provided in the next section. Convention on the InterGovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, opened for signature 6 March
1948, 289 UNTS 3, amended and renamed as Convention on the International
Maritime Organization, 9 UTS 61 [IMO Convention].
13
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 12 ILM 1319, as
amended by the 1978 Protocol to the 1973 Convention, 1341 UNTS 3, 17 ILM 546
[MARPOL Convention]. To date, the MARPOL Convention has adopted six annexes
3

produced by the IMO have assured the international community of progress regarding the
adoption of energy-efficiency measures. Since these outcomes have been achieved since July
2011, there has not been much scholarly analysis on these rules as yet. Current discussions
mainly focus on the institutional interaction14 between the IMO, the UNFCCC, and the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), as well as the proposed market-based
measures (MBMs) in relation to the reduction of GHG emissions from ships.15 This article
conducts a comprehensive analysis of the IMO’s efforts in regulating these issues.
The first part of this article looks briefly at the IMO’s mandate for regulating shipping
GHG emissions. Having established the central role of the IMO in providing a solution to the
problem, the article then examines and assesses the IMO GHG regime from three
perspectives, namely the evolution of the regime, Annex VI and its amendments to the
MARPOL Convention, and the main outcomes achieved within the IMO.
II. IMO’S MANDATE TO REGULATE GHG EMISSIONS FROM INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING AND THE
APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES

and their revisions, namely, Annex I on Oil (entered into force 2 October 1983);
Annex II on Noxious Liquid Substances Carried in Bulk (entered into force 6 April
1987); Annex III on Harmful Substances Carried in Packaged Form (entered into
force 1 July 1992); Annex IV on Sewage (entered into force 27 September 2003);
Annex V on Garbage (entered into force 31 December 1988); and Annex VI on Air
Pollution from Ships (entered into force 19 May 2005).
14
See, eg, Lindsey Wuisan, Judith Van Leeuwen, and CSA Van Koppen, Greening
International Shipping through Private Governance: A Case Study of the Clean
Shipping Project 36(1) Marine Policy 165 (2012); Hackmann, supra note 10;
Sebastian Oberthür, The Climate Change Regime: Interactions with ICAO, IMO, and
the EU Burden-Sharing Agreement, in Sebastian Oberthür and Thomas Gehring (eds),
Institutional Interaction in Global Environmental Governance, 53 (2006); Oberthür,
supra note 10.
15
See, eg, Harilaos N Psaraftis, Market-based Measures for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from
Ships: A Review 11(2) WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs 211 (2012); Henrik
Ringbom, Global Problem--Regional Solution? International Law Reflections on an
EU CO2 Emissions Trading Scheme for Ships 26(4) Int’l J Marine & Coastal L 613
(2011); Md Saiful Karim and Shawkat Alam, Climate Change and Reduction of
Emissions of Greenhouse Gases from Ships: An Appraisal 1(1) Asian J Int’l L 131
(2011); Jodie Moffat, Arranging Deckchairs on the Titanic: Climate Change,
Greenhouse Gas Emissions and International Shipping 24(2) Australian & New
Zealand Maritime LJ 104 (2010).
4

To cope with the increasingly serious issues of safety at sea and marine pollution,16 the
United Nations Maritime Conference was held in Geneva on 6 March 1948. This conference
adopted a convention that formally established the Inter-Governmental Maritime
Consultative Organization (IMCO), which subsequently changed name to the IMO in May
1982.17 Article 1 of the IMO Convention outlines five purposes of the organization, which
can be broadly summarized into its jurisdiction on technical and commercial matters such as
discriminatory practices by shipping companies. Due to the possible threat to the practice of
free enterprise in the shipping industry from the commercial jurisdiction of the IMO, many
states have attempted to limit the purposes of the IMO to technical aspects rather than
commercial regulation. Consequently, the IMO has focused primarily on its technical
jurisdiction.18 Therefore, the main purpose of the IMO is ‘to encourage the general adoption
of the highest practicable standards in matters concerning maritime safety, efficiency of
navigation and the prevention and control of marine pollution from ships.’19
The IMO’s structure has developed, reflecting its evolving mandate.20 Initially, the
IMO only comprised the Assembly, the Council, and the Maritime Safety Committee
(MSC).21 Currently, the IMO consists of an Assembly, a Council, and five main Committees:
the MSC, the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC), the Legal Committee, the
Technical Co-operation Committee, and the Facilitation Committee. Among these, the
MEPC, which comprises all member states, is responsible for the reduction of GHG
emissions from international shipping. In addition, the inter-sessional meeting of the IMO’s
Working Group on GHG Emissions from Ships (GHG-WG) was established between two
MEPC sessions. These changes indicate the growing significance of marine environmental
protection and co-operation among various institutions.22

16

GP Pamborides, International Shipping Law: Legislation and Enforcement, at 79–80
(1999).
17
IMO Convention, supra note 12.
18
To date, the IMO has never been allowed to exercise its full economic mandate. Alan
Khee-Jin Tan, Vessel-Source Marine Pollution: The Law and Politics of International
Regulation, at 75 (2006); see also Pamborides, supra note 16 at 83.
19
IMO Convention, supra note 12, Article 1(a).
20
Tan, supra note 18 at 76.
21
Lawrence Juda, IMCO and the Regulation of Ocean Pollution from Ships 26(3) Int’l &
Comparative LQ 558, 559 (1977).
22
For instance, the establishment of the Facilitation Committee is to harmonize shipping
procedures and eliminate unnecessary formalities and ‘red tape’ in international
shipping. Tan, supra note 18 at 76.
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Currently, there are two views concerning the IMO’s mandate in regulating GHG
emissions from international shipping. One view is that the IMO’s mandate comes from the
Kyoto Protocol.23 Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol requests the Annex I states of the
UNFCCC to ‘work through the IMO’ to limit or reduce their shipping GHG emissions.
Additionally, the acceptance of this mandate by the IMO also complies with the IMO
Convention.24 However, this authorization was given to the IMO only after the UNFCCC
failed to reach consensus on the allocation of such emissions among different states.25 In
other words, at that time, the IMO was generally regarded as the most competent
international organization to regulate this issue. The other view attributes the IMO’s mandate
on this issue to the IMO Convention and UNCLOS on the grounds that Articles 1(a) and 59
of the IMO Convention and Articles 211 and 212 of the UNCLOS provide the IMO with such
competence.26 However, both views have their legal bases, and it is open to debate which
rules should prevail if there is a conflict between the Kyoto Protocol, the IMO Convention,
and the UNCLOS on the issue. In this case, it might be appropriate to strike a compromise
between both views. Or to be more specific, the IMO Convention and the UNCLOS provide
the IMO with general competence to regulate this type of issue, while the Kyoto Protocol
provides the IMO with a specific mandate in regulating this matter.

23

See, eg, Haifeng Wang, GHG Emissions from the International Goods Movement by Ships
and the Adaptation Funding Distribution, in Zongwei Luo (ed), Green Finance and
Sustainability: Environmentally-Aware Business Models and Technologies, 274 at
275 (2011).
24
IMO Convention, supra note 12, Article 68.
25
Since 1995, when the first Conference to the Parties (COP-1) to the UNFCCC was held,
the SBSTA within the UNFCCC has been working on the possible inclusion of GHG
emissions from international shipping into the Kyoto Protocol. In 1996, the SBSTA
selected five options from eight choices as the basis for discussing the possible
allocation of emissions among different states but failed in reaching consensus. Due
to the highly technical and international character of the shipping industry, the
UNFCCC finally decided to turn the issue to the IMO. Article 2(2) of the Kyoto
Protocol formally excludes the regulation of GHG emissions from international
shipping from the Kyoto Protocol, while emissions from domestic shipping are still
included in national targets for Annex I states. See Possible Revisions to the
Guidelines for the Preparation of National Communications by Parties Included in
Annex I to the Convention, SBSTA 4th Session, Doc UNFCCC/SBSTA/1996/9/Add.1
(24 October 1996) 11; Karim and Alam, supra note 15 at 134; Oberthür, supra note
10 at 193.
26
This opinion has been held by the Sub-Division for Legal Affairs within the IMO. See also,
eg, Karim and Alam, supra note 15 at 147–48; Oberthür, supra note 10 at 195.
6

Seen in this way, the two views are not conflicting. This approach is underpinned by
the newly adopted revised Annex VI to the MARPOL Convention. The preamble of Annex
VI provides:
Recognizing also that adoption of the amendments to Annex VI in no way prejudges the negotiations
held in other international fora, such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC), nor affect the positions of the countries that participate in such negotiation.27

This expression appears to represent the IMO’s view on this issue. That is, regarding the
decisions on GHG emissions from ships, those made by the IMO, including the revised
Annex VI, are independent from those reached within the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol regime.
Nevertheless, as an obligation under the Kyoto Protocol, the IMO needs to report its progress
on this issue to the UNFCCC on a regular basis.28 Based on the earlier approach, it might be
deduced that theoretically both the common but differentiated responsibility (CBDR)
principle (from the UNFCCC) and the no more favourable treatment (NMFT) principle (from
the IMO) should be applied to the issue under discussion. To better understand this view, a
general background on the two principles is provided.
The CBDR principle requires both developed and developing states to contribute to
addressing environmental problems and imposes the primary responsibility on developed
states due to their different historical contributions to the problems and the differentiated
capability of developed and developing states. It can be traced back to the 1972 Stockholm
Conference on the Human Environment, when the concept of sustainable development was
first raised and the different development priorities of developed countries and developing
countries were identified.29 Thus, the Stockholm conference represented ‘the first time that an
international consensus had been reached, at least in theory, on applying CBDR and
differentiated standards to international environmental problems.’30 This principle was

27

MARPOL Convention, supra note 13, Annex VI, preamble [emphasis added].
Within the IMO, the MEPC reports any progress relating to GHG emissions from
international shipping to the Council of the IMO, while the IMO provides regular
progress reports to the SBSTA within the UNFCCC.
29
See, eg, Nina E Bafundo, Compliance with the Ozone Treaty: Weak States and the
Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility 21(3) Am U Intl L Rev 461 at
468 (2006).
30
Michael Weisslitz, Rethinking the Equitable Principle of Common but Differentiated
Responsibility: Differential versus Absolute Norms of Compliance and Contribution

28
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implicit in the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer to the
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer31 and first explicitly formulated in
Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.32 To date, it has been
widely accepted and endorsed by many conventions and treaties, including the 1992
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD),33 the 1992 UNFCCC, and its Kyoto Protocol.34
The NMFT principle refers to ‘port States enforcing applicable standards in a uniform
manner to all ships in their ports, regardless of flag.’35 Article 3 of the IMO Convention treats
the ‘normal processes of international shipping business’ as a prior way for the IMO to deal
with shipping related matters, which indeed provides a legal basis for the NMFT principle.
The term NMFT was included in the MARPOL Convention and applies to all of the annexes
of the convention.36 So far, this policy has been consistent without exception among all fiftythree IMO treaty instruments currently in existence.
Given that the CBDR principle runs through the Kyoto Protocol,37 it could be
construed that the authorization of the IMO’s mandate from the Kyoto Protocol indicates that
the CBDR principle should also apply to the reduction of GHG emissions from ships.
Nevertheless, in practice, developed countries generally insist on the application of the
NMFT principle to this issue, while developing countries back the CBDR principle.38 It
in the Global Climate Change Context 13(2) Colorado J Int’l Envt’l Law & Policy
473 at 480 (2002).
31
Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, 26 ILM 1550, Article 5.
This protocol requires both developed countries and developing countries to work
together to reduce controlled substances but provides developing countries with a tenyear grace period. This practice is consistent with the principle of common but
differentiated responisbility (CBDR), but the term of the CBDR was not put forward
with explicit explanation. Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer,
1513 UNTS 323 [Vienna Convention].
32
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 31 ILM 874 (1992), Principle 7 [Rio
Declaration].
33
Convention on Biological Diversity, 31 ILM 818 (1992), Article 20(4) [CBD].
34
UNFCCC, supra note 5, Article 3–4; Kyoto Protocol, supra note 5, Article 10.
35
Buhaug et al, supra note 6 at 20.
36
MARPOL Convention, supra note 13, Article 5(4) stipulates that, ‘[w]ith respect to the ship
of non-PArticleies to the Convention, PArticleies shall apply the requirements of the
present Convention as may be necessary to ensure that no more favourable treatment
is given to such ships’ [emphasis added].
37
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 5, Article 10.
38
See, eg, the United States, Spain, and Sweden underscore the application of the no more
favourable treatment (NMFT) principle to this issue, whereas China, India, Brazil,
Saudi Arabia, and Peru support the application of the CBDR principle. Report of the
Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixtieth Session, MEPC 60th
Session, Agenda Item 22, Doc MEPC 60/22 (12 April 2010), Annex 4.
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seems this conflict can be resolved if both the principles apply to the issue, and this approach
has been accepted by UNFCCC Secretariat39 as well as by some states and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs).40 Is it feasible for the IMO to apply both the CBDR principle and the
NMFT principle when it utilizes its competence to address the GHG emissions from ships?
Probably, the key lies in the appropriate interpretation of ‘differentiated responsibility’ under
the CBDR principle. Current international environmental agreements indicate that the
differentiated responsibility consists of three categories, namely differentiated central
obligations, differentiated implementation arrangements, and the granting of assistance
including financial and technological assistance.41 To reach acceptable methods of applying
the CBDR principle in reducing shipping GHG emissions by both developed and developing
countries is quite possible, provided the interests of the various stakeholders are taken into
consideration and well balanced. Although the CBDR principle was not fully incorporated in
the energy efficiency measures recently adopted by the IMO, some of the proposed MBMs
do apply the CBDR principle. Further discussion of these issues is contained in the following
sections.
III. THE IMO GHG EMISSIONS REGIME

The IMO has partially regulated GHG emissions from international shipping by means of
various negotiations and discussions within its MEPC. The conventions, codes, resolutions,
and various discussions achieved or conducted during this process constitute the IMO regime
on the reduction of shipping GHG emissions or, in other words, the IMO GHG emissions
regime. This part of the article first reviews the development of this regime and then
examines Annex VI to the MARPOL Convention and its amendments—the major
39

Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixty-First Session, MEPC
61st Session, Agenda Item 24, Doc MEPC 61/24 (6 October 2010), Annex 6, 2. At the
sixty-first MEPC meeting, the UNFCCC Secretariat made a statement, which asserts
that ‘[w]e have to commit ourselves to work on a solution which respects both
principles, and allows each treaty regime to retain the integrity of its principles and
practices.’
40
See, eg, Malaysia and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) support the application of
the two principles to the issue. Report of the Marine Environment Protection
Committee on Its Sixtieth Session, MEPC 60th Session, Agenda Item 22, Doc MEPC
60/22 (12 April 2010), Annex 4, 10; Ensuring No Net Incidence on Developing
Countries from a Global Maritime Market-Based Mechanism, submitted by WWF,
IMO Doc MEPC 63/5/6 (22 December 2011).
41
Lavanya Rajamani, Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law, at 191
(2006).
9

achievement of this regime to date. Finally, the outcomes within the MEPC are summarized
and analysed.
1. Evolution of the IMO GHG Emissions Regime
Although discussions on GHG emissions from ships within the IMO started in the late 1980s,
it is generally accepted that the IMO’s work on this issue formally commenced in 1997.42
During that year, the MARPOL Conference not only adopted a protocol on Annex VI to the
MARPOL Convention but also adopted Resolution 8 on ‘carbon dioxide emissions from
ships,’ which requested the IMO to undertake a study on GHG emissions from ships and
consider feasible carbon dioxide reduction strategies.43 Following joint efforts by several
internationally renowned research institutes, a study of GHG emissions from ships was
published in 2000.44 This study not only answered the question of why GHG emissions from
shipping should be reduced, but it also explored how to deal with the issue. It canvassed the
reduction potential of different technical, operational, and market-based approaches, which to
some extent provide a ‘road map’ for future policies within the IMO. In 2003, a resolution
was adopted by the IMO Assembly on ‘IMO policies and practices related to the reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions from ships,’ urging the MEPC to ‘identify and develop the
mechanism or mechanisms needed to achieve the limitation or reduction of GHG emissions
from international shipping.’45 Since then, the MEPC has been working on this issue by
means of various negotiations and discussions within its series of session meetings as well as
in its GHG-WGs.
The evolution of the IMO GHG emissions regime has been lengthy and intermittent.
During a fourteen-year period from September 1997 to July 2011, no binding agreements
regarding GHG emissions from international shipping were reached within the IMO, and
42

IMO, Main Events in IMO's Work on Limitation and Reduction of Greenhouse Gas
Emissions from International Shipping (2011),
<http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/resources/Pages/Greenhouse%20gas%20emission
s.aspx> 3.
43
Ibid.
44
These institutes were from Norway and the United States, namely MARINTEK (Norway),
Det Norske Veritas (Norway), ECON, Center for Economic Analysis (Norway), and
Carnegie Mellon University (United States). Kjell Skjølsvik et al, Study of
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships, at 7 (2000).
45
Resolution A.963(23) on IMO Policies and Practices Related to the Reduction of
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships, IMO Assembly 23rd Session, Agenda Item 19
(5 December 2003).
10

producers of emissions were exempt from liabilities under this regime. On 15 July 2011,
shipping GHG emissions were partially regulated by technical and operational measures.
Intensive discussions on this issue have only occurred since 2008. During this process, the
IMO reiterated at least three times its role as the most competent international body in
regulating GHG emissions from shipping. This claim might have resulted from competitive
institutional pressure from other international organizations such as the UNFCCC and the
possibility of unilateral measures being adopted by individual states and the European Union
(EU).46 It has been generally accepted that the measures tackling shipping GHG emissions
can be classified into technical measures, operational measures, and MBMs. Concerning the
technical and operational measures, the IMO is the only competent international body
governing the issue. The IMO has been mandated to regulate technical matters on shipping,
and currently no other international body possesses the IMO’s technical expertise. In practice,
the global shipping industry,47 including national shipping industries from the UNFCCC’s
non-Annex I states,48 takes the view that the IMO is the only competent organization to
regulate the issue from a technical and operational perspective. Against this backdrop,
technical and operational measures have been regulated by the IMO in the form of energy
efficiency measures under the revised Annex VI of the MARPOL Convention in July 2011.
However, this may not be the case in the future regulation of MBMs. Since some MBM
options involve out-of-sector emission reductions and international trade that are beyond the
competence of the IMO, it is possible that a working group between the IMO and the
46

See Oberthür, supra note 10 at 202–3.
For instance, the four Round Table members, namely the International Chamber of
Shipping (ICS), the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO), the
International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO) and the
International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners (INTERCARGO), asserted that
both technical and operational measures and market-based measures (MBMs) should
be governed by the IMO. Future IMO Regulation Regarding Greenhouse Gas
Emissions from International Shipping, submitted by Denmark, Marshall Islands,
BIMCO, ICS, INTERCARGO, INTERTANKO, and OCIMF, MEPC 57th Session,
Agenda Item 4, Doc MEPC 57/4/2 (21 December 2008) at para 10; Round Table of
International Shipping Associations, Round Table Associations Position Paper on
GHG+MBMs (22 February 2012),
<https://www.bimco.org/About/Press/Press_Releases/2012/2012_02_22_Round_Tabl
e_MBM.aspx>.
48
For instance, China’s shipping industry generally supports the IMO’s role in regulating
technical and operational measures to tackle shipping GHG emissions. Wang Erde,
‘Consensus Achieved by Reduction Negotiations and China Is to Start Its Reduction
in 2019,’ Twenty-First Century Business Herald (Beijing), 6 July 2011,
<http://stock.sohu.com/20110726/n314586469.shtml>.

47
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UNFCCC or the World Trade Organization (WTO) could be established to collaborate in
addressing this issue. In fact, some UNFCCC non-Annex I states such as China, India, and
Malaysia doubt the competence of the IMO in regulating MBMs and assert that MBMs
should be determined by the UNFCCC.49
The debate on the incorporation of either the CBDR principle or the NMFT principle
into the reduction of GHG emissions from ships has run through all of the negotiations and
discussions within the IMO. The conflict of the two principles has delayed the advancement
of the negotiations within the MEPC.50 To expedite the negotiation process within the MEPC,
the fifty-second MEPC meeting adopted a two-step strategy, according to which the MEPC
was to deal with all of the technical matters related to GHG limitations or reductions first and
then resolve the politically related issues including the application of the CBDR or NMFT
principles.51 However, it has been difficult to separate the two steps. In 2008, the fiftyseventh MEPC meeting adopted nine fundamental principles as a basis for future regulations,
although they were opposed by many developing countries. Principle 2 provides that the
future IMO framework should be ‘binding and equally applicable to all flag States in order to
avoid evasion,’52 which incorporates the NMFT principle. The fifty-eighth MEPC meeting in
2008 discussed a proposed change to Principle 2, which was amended to read that it was,
‘binding and equally applicable to all ships, without this requiring States to accept similar
regulations/standards in other fora.’53 In this case, the responsible entity shifts from flag
states to all ships and the application of this principle is limited to either the MEPC or the
IMO. However, the NMFT principle remained in this version, and, consequently, no
consensus was achieved. As to the proposed MBMs, the application of the CBDR or the
NMFT principle has been the main focus of debate, which can be seen from the succeeding
rounds of negotiations. It is concluded that the evolution of the IMO GHG emissions regime
is a process where various technical and operational measures and MBMs have been
49
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discussed and negotiated in an attempt to reach agreement between developed and developing
countries. To date, this regime is still under development; however, some outcomes,
including the newly amended Annex VI and some guidelines, have been achieved within the
MEPC.54
2. Annex VI to the MARPOL Convention and Its Amendments
As a means of reducing shipping GHG emissions, technical and operational measures were
raised and examined in the report entitled Study of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships in
2000 (the first IMO GHG study). Based on both a short-term and long-term perspectives, the
report classifies carbon dioxide reduction potential by technical measures into two categories:
measures for new ships and measures for existing ships.55 It identifies various technical and
operational measures and concludes that these measures have a limited potential for reducing
shipping emissions, and it might be ‘more feasible’ for the shipping industry to implement
these measures primarily through new ship construction.56 The second IMO GHG study in
2009 emphasizes the role of new ship construction in increasing efficiency and reducing
emissions and proposes a mandatory energy efficiency design index (EEDI) for new ships as
an incentive to improve the design efficiency of these ships.57 Based on this work and on
intensive discussions and negotiations on various technical, operational, and market-based
measures within the IMO, the sixty-second MEPC meeting adopted the revised Annex VI to
the MARPOL Convention on 15 July 2011. This amendment represents ‘the first ever
mandatory global [and legally binding] GHG reduction regime for an international industry
sector.’58 Since that time, GHG emissions from shipping have been partially regulated.
However, this amendment to Annex VI only regulates a package of mandatory technical and
operational measures to reduce GHG emissions from international shipping. By adding a new
Chapter 4 to Annex VI on the regulation on energy efficiency for ships, the amendment
54
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makes mandatory the EEDI for new ships and the Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan
(SEEMP) for all ships.
Due to the deadlock in the negotiations of the CBDR and NMFT principles within the
IMO, a breakthrough on other measures including MBMs has not yet been achieved. The
successful outcome on the technical and operational regulation can be attributed to the
following two factors. First, the energy efficiency measures were included in the revised
Annex VI rather than creating a new Annex VII to the MARPOL Convention. For this
amendment to Annex VI, the ‘tacit acceptance’ procedure applied. According to this
procedure, amendments of the MARPOL Convention annexes or appendices to such annexes
enter into force on a specified date unless a specific number of state parties object by an
agreed date.59 Due to the technical nature of these annexes and appendices, it might be
inferred that the ‘tacit acceptance’ procedure basically applies to technical amendments. In
this case, the ‘silence’ of a member state represents its approval and makes a formal
acceptance unnecessary.60 This procedure, however, does not apply to either the articles of
the convention or to the introduction of a new annex.61 The main benefit of the ‘tacit
acceptance’ procedure lies in the expedited entry into force of the amendments. This
procedure partially explains why these revisions entered into force on 1 January 2013 shortly
after their adoption, despite the opposition of many developing countries.62 Second, the
voting mechanism within the MEPC accelerates the adoption of these measures. Rule 27 of
the Rules of Procedures of the MEPC provides that decisions of the committee and of its
subsidiary bodies are made by a majority of the members present and voting rather than by a
consensus.63 This policy ensures that a resolution can be adopted by the MEPC even if some
countries with large owned fleets oppose it. To change this situation, many developing
countries proposed at the sixty-fourth MEPC meeting that all decisions of the MEPC on GHG

59

MARPOL Convention, supra note 13, Article 16.
Pamborides, supra note 16 at 101.
61
MARPOL Convention, supra note 13, Article 16(2)(f), 16(5).
62
See, eg, Comments on the Proposed Mandatory Energy Efficiency Regulations, submitted
by China, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa, Doc MEPC 62/5/10 (5 May 2011). The cosponsors of this proposal, namely China, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa, opposed
the adoption of the amendment because of its exclusion of the CBDR principle,
technical uncertainty, and other factors. They also opposed the inclusion of energy
efficiency measures in MARPOL Annex VI due to the different nature of GHGs and
other air pollutants.
63
IMO, Basic Documents, volume 1, at 113 (2010).

60

14

emissions from ships should be adopted by consensus, but the debate on this issue has been
postponed until the sixty-fifth MEPC meeting in 2013.64
The energy efficiency measures apply to all ships of 400 gross tonnage and above.65
Due to the global financial crisis since 2009, this new regulation has imposed a great deal of
pressure on global shipping industries, in particular, those from developing countries.
Nevertheless, under Regulation 19, there is flexibility in the application of the EEDI:
Regulation 19
1. This chapter shall apply to all ships of 400 gross tonnage and above …
4. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of this regulation, the Administration may waive the
requirement for a ship of 400 gross tonnage and above from complying with regulation 20 and
regulation 21.
5. The provision of paragraph 4 of this regulation shall not apply to ships of 400 gross tonnage and
above:
1. for which the building contract is placed on or after 1 January 2017; or
2. in the absence of a building contract, the keel of which is laid or which is at a similar stage of
construction on or after 1 July 2017; or
3. the delivery of which is on or after 1 July 2019; or
4. in cases of a major conversion of a new or existing ship, as defined in regulation 2.24, on or
after 1 January 2017, and in which regulation 5.4.2 and regulation 5.4.3 of chapter 2 apply.
[emphasis added]

Regulation 19.4 and 19.5 indicate that for some countries the actual commencement date of
the EEDI might be postponed six and a half years from 1 January 2013.66 Since the
administration is generally the flag state of a ship,67 this regulation gives the ships from
developing countries a long lead time for their preparation and adjustment. This treatment is
still non-differentiated between developed and developing countries and thus does not apply
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the CBDR principle.68 In practice, this waiver might be used primarily by ships flying the
flags of developing countries due to the much more stringent requirements by developed
countries. Nevertheless, prior to the adoption of this amendment, Vanuatu submitted a
proposal on possible exemptions from the EEDI requirements for ships trading to the least
developed countries and small island developing states, but it was not accepted by the sixtyfirst MEPC meeting.69
In this sense, this waiver clause could be deemed to be a compromise between
developed countries and developing countries. According to an assessment by Lloyd’s
Register and Det Norske Veritas, the impact of the waiver clause (Regulation 19.5) is
estimated to be low on the total emission reduction potential.70 This is because low
compliance costs and the commercial disadvantages associated with non-compliance make it
unattractive for flag states or shipowners to opt for an EEDI waiver.71 Given the situations of
the countries supporting this waiver clause, notably Brazil, China, and Saudi Arabia, the most
likely level of waiver is only 5 percent.72 To assist with the implementation of the mandatory
68
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regulations on energy efficiency for ships in the 2011 Annex VI, the sixty-third MEPC
meeting in March 2012 adopted four important guidelines.73 These guidelines, together with
various technical, operational, and MBMs, are discussed in the next section.
3. Outcomes within the MEPC
Measures dealing with shipping GHG emissions generally can be classified into three
categories: technical measures, operational measures, and MBMs. These measures have been
widely discussed and negotiated within the MEPC since the adoption of Resolution 8 on
‘carbon dioxide emissions from ships’ in 1997. Currently, technical and operational measures
are included in Annex VI to the MARPOL Convention in the forms of the EEDI and the
SEEMP requirements respectively, whereas MBMs are still unregulated. This section
introduces the newly adopted technical and operational measures, followed by an assessment
on their benefits and deficiencies. It then provideds an analysis and assessment of potential
MBMs.

A. Technical Measures
The EEDI is the main technical measure regulated by the revised Annex VI to the MARPOL
Convention in 2011. The EEDI provides a specific figure representing a minimum energy
efficiency level for certain ship types and size segments, expressed in grams of carbon
dioxide per ship’s capacity-nautical mile (for example, gross tonne nautical miles). The lower
EEDI indicates better energy efficiency of ship design. Regulations 20 and 21 divide it into

October 2011, the current tonnage and number of ships for these three flags totally
cover 4.6 percent of the global fleet.
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These four guidelines are: Guidelines on the Method of Calculation of the Attained Energy
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MEPC 63/23 (2 March 2012), Annex 8 [EEDI Calculation Guidelines]; Guidelines for
the Development of A Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP),
Resolution MEPC.213(63), Doc MEPC 63/23 (2 March 2012), Annex 9 [SEEMP
Guidelines]; Guidelines on Survey and Certification of the Energy Efficiency Design
Index (EEDI), Resolution MEPC.214(63), Doc MEPC 63/23/Add.1 (2 March 2012),
Annex 10 [EEDI Survey and Certification Guidelines]; Guidelines for Calculation of
Reference Lines for Use with the Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI), Resolution
MEPC.215(63), Doc MEPC 63/23/Add.1 (2 March 2012), Annex 11 [EEDI
Reference Lines Guidelines].
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attained EEDI and required EEDI,74 and both of them are calculated by a formula based on
the technical design parameters for a given ship.75 Based on the formula, the attained EEDI
should be less than or equal to the required EEDI.76 As a ‘non-prescriptive’ and
‘performance-based’ mechanism, the EEDI only requires a minimum energy-efficiency
level.77 Provided the EEDI requirement is achieved, ship designers and shipbuilders are free
to choose the most cost-efficient solutions for the ship to meet the regulations. The EEDI
could provide a strong incentive for the shipping industry to improve ship fuel consumption
with updated technical developments. Meanwhile, the EEDI is basically a ‘hard rule’ rather
than a commercial incentive scheme. Based on the mandatory EEDI requirements,
substandard ships might be detained, fined by port states, or even forbidden to trade, although
the way to achieve the emissions reduction is left to the shipping industry.78
Aside from the EEDI waiver clause under Regulation 19 of Annex VI, the EEDI does
not apply to all ship types or to all types of propulsion systems. Regulation 21 (required
EEDI) only lists seven types of ships, namely bulk carriers, gas carriers, tankers, container
ships, general cargo ships, refrigerated cargo ships, and combination carriers.79 Ships with
diesel-electric propulsion, turbine propulsion, and hybrid propulsion are currently excluded
from the EEDI requirement.80 The exemptions for these types of ships can be mainly
attributed to the technical difficulty of incorporating them into the current EEDI formulae due
to the complexity of the shipping emissions. Nevertheless, as the first step in reducing the
majority of shipping emissions sources, the current EEDI coverage has embraced 70 percent
of emissions from new ships.81 The regulated seven types of ships are essentially those
designed to transport cargos, representing ‘the largest and most energy intensive segments of
74
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the world merchant fleet.’82 The MEPC is currently working on the development of EEDI
frameworks for ships not covered by the current EEDI, such as roll-on–roll-off (ro-ro) cargo
ships, ro-ro passenger ships, passenger ships, as well as ships with non-conventional
propulsion systems.83 This step-by-step approach was utilized by the IMO to relieve strong
opposition from developing countries and expedite the regulation progress within the MEPC.
However, the amendment was not reached by consensus within the MEPC, which indicates a
challenge on future implementation.84 As a global mandatory instrument, the amended Annex
VI requests port states to verify if there is a valid International Energy Efficiency Certificate
on ships calling at their ports so as to monitor the compliance of ships.85 Nevertheless, some
flag states may not join the instrument, and the ships flying their flags may seek suitable
routes to avoid the regulation. To facilitate the enforcement of EEDI requirements, the
amendment and subsequent guidelines have provided a phased approach, and an IMO
commissioned report offers technological options.
First, Regulation 21 provides four phases for the implementation of the EEDI. Phase 0
(1 January 2013–31 December 2014) provides a two-year grace period for all ships regardless
of their flags to be exempt from EEDI requirements. This regulation gives the shipping
industry lead time to do necessary preparations such as technology research and development
and staff training. This measure was initially proposed by China as a five-year Phase 0 and
was supported by other developing countries.86 Thus, it is actually a compromise achieved
between developed countries and developing countries. In Phase 1 (1 January 2015–31
December 2019), a carbon dioxide reduction level of 10 percent is mandated, and this
percentage will become higher every five years to be in line with updated technological
developments in efficiency and reduction measures. In Phase 3 (1 January 2025 onwards), a
30 percent reduction is set for most ship types calculated from a reference line for ships built
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between 2000 and 2010.87 This schedule for implementation follows a step-by-step approach
and provides differentiated requirements for different ship sizes. Generally, the EEDI
requirements on ship size below certain capacities are lower. This arrangement meets the
special demand by various states for trade considerations, physical port limitations, and cargo
logistic issues since not all states need large-size ships. Although, according to the economics
theory of ‘economies of scale,’ at a given speed, the larger the ship the lower the fuel
consumption per unit of cargo.88
Second, to meet the EEDI requirements for new ships, the selection of technologies is
vital for ship designers and shipbuilders. An assessment report commissioned by the IMO
provides fifteen types of technologies for reducing future ship’s EEDI as shown in Table 1.89
These technologies can be classified into five groups, namely:

•

ship capacity enhancement;

•

hull and propeller;

•

engines, waste heat recovery, and propulsion system;

•

alternative fuels; and

•

alternative sources of energy.90

Table 1. Technologies for EEDI Reduction
No.

EEDI Reduction Measures

Remark

1

Optimized hull dimensions and form

Ship design for efficiency via choice of main dimensions
(port and canal restrictions) and hull forms

2

Lightweight construction

New lightweight ship construction material

3

Hull coating

Use of advanced hull coatings/paints

4

Hull air lubrication system

Air cavity via injection of air under/around the hull to reduce
wet surface and thereby ship resistance

5

Optimization of propeller-hull

Propeller-hull-rudder design optimization plus relevant

87
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interface and flow devices

changes to ship’s aft body

6

Contra-rotating propeller

Two propellers in series; rotating at different direction

7

Engine efficiency improvement

De-rating, long-stroke, electronic injection, variable
geometry turbocharging, and so on

8

Waster heat recovery

Main and auxiliary engines’ exhaust gas waste heat recovery
and conversion to electric power

9

Gas fuelled

Natural gas fuel and dual fuel engines

10

Hybrid electric power and

For some ships, the use of electric or hybrid would be more

propulsion concepts

efficient

Reducing on-board power demand

Maximum heat recovery and minimizing required electrical

(auxiliary system and hotel loads)

loads flexible power solutions and power management

Variable speed drive for pumps,

Use of variable speed electric motors for control of rotating

fans, and so on

flow machinery leads to significant reduction in their energy

11

12

use
13

Wind power (sail, wind engine, and

Sails, flettner rotor, kites, and so on, which are considered to

so on)

be emerging technologies

14

Solar power

Solar photovoltaic cells

15

Design speed reduction (new builds)

Reducing design speed via choice of lower power or derated
engines

Source: Zabi Bazari and Tore Longva, Assessment of IMO Mandated Energy Efficiency Measures for
International Shipping, Doc MEPC 63/INF.2 (31 October 2011), Annex at 14–15.

Compared with the seven types of technologies available for new ships as indicated in the
first IMO GHG study, there are currently more choices available for the shipping industry.91
It is projected that during Phases 0 and 1 (1 January 2013–31 December 2019), hull,
propeller, and main engine optimization will contribute more to EEDI compliance, while
during Phases 2 and 3 (1 January 2020 onwards), new technologies and design speed
reduction will be utilized more to meet the EEDI requirements.92 The order of these
technologies does not imply any prioritization. However, it is of ‘critical importance’ to
ensure safe navigation under adverse conditions, while energy efficiency of international
shipping is promoted.93 Based on this understanding, the need for a minimum speed is
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incorporated into the EEDI formula and into Regulation 21.5 of Annex VI, although reducing
speed is generally regarded as the easiest way to improve a ship’s fuel efficiency.94
Third, to ensure the smooth and uniform implementation of the EEDI, Annex VI and
the Guidelines on Survey and Certification of the Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI
Survey and Certification Guidelines) regulate a two-stage survey and verification process.95
Based on regulations 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 of Annex VI and the Guidelines on the Method of
Calculation of the Attained Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI Calculation Guidelines),
the EEDI Survey and Certification Guidelines divide the process into two stages: preliminary
verification at the design stage and final verification at sea trial.96 At the first stage, a report
of pre-verification will be provided by the verifier to the submitter once the verification is
complete. At the second stage, a certificate will be issued if a ship has passed the
certification. Through this process, verifiers of the EEDI of ships ensure that ships under
survey and certification comply with the EEDI requirements.97

B. Operational Measures
The SEEMP is the operational measure regulated by Annex VI of the MARPOL Convention,
and it constitutes the other component of the energy efficiency measures besides the EEDI.
This plan provides a flexible mechanism for shipowners and ship operators to monitor ship
and fleet efficiency performance over time in a cost-effective manner. The main objective of
the plan is to minimize shipping GHG emissions by means of reducing fuel consumption,98
while the energy efficiency operational indicator (EEOI) is often utilized as a monitoring tool
and to establish benchmarks related to the ships’ energy efficiency.99 Regulation 22 of Annex
VI briefly regulates the SEEMP, which provides that ‘[e]ach ship shall keep on board a ship
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specific Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP). This may form part of the
ship’s Safety Management System (SMS).’100
Based on Regulations 19.1 and 22.1 of Annex VI, the SEEMP applies to all existing
and new ships of 400 gross tonnage and above on a mandatory basis. As a ‘ship specific’
plan, the SEEMP adopts a four-step approach to improve a ship’s energy efficiency, namely
planning, implementation, monitoring, and self-evaluation and improvement. The Guidelines
for the Development of a Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP Guidelines)
introduce procedures and measures at each stage and incorporate best practices for the fuelefficient operation of ships.101 Moreover, similar to the EEDI Guidelines, the SEEMP
Guidelines also highlight the importance of safe navigation.102 By introducing specific
procedures, measures, and best practices along with the four stages of the plan, the SEEMP
urges shipowners and ship operators at each stage to consider new technologies and practices
when seeking to optimize the energy-efficiency performance of a ship. Additionally, the
guidelines provide a reference for the classification societies and shipping companies to make
their own SEEMPs.
To meet these SEEMP requirements, it is important for a ship to adopt specific
operational measures for each voyage. Operational measures aiming to reduce the fuel
consumption and carbon dioxide emissions can be classified into three categories.103 The first
category is enhanced technical and operational management. Measures related to enhanced
weather routing, hull and propeller cleaning, better main and auxiliary engine maintenance
and turning, and efficient operation of larger electrical consumers are in this category. The
second category is enhanced logistics and fleet planning. For instance, combining cargoes to
achieve a higher utilization rate, optimization of logistic chains, larger cargo batches,
adjustments for optimized arrival times and slower steaming, and changed contract formats
between charter and shipowner. The third category is port-related measures. Examples
include larger port capacity, quicker loading and discharging, flexible design of cargo
handling equipment, more efficient port clearance and slot time allocation, and fewer
restrictions on ship draft, beam, or length.
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A well-implemented SEEMP might lead to enhanced technical and operational
management as illustrated earlier in the first category.104 The second and third categories,
however, are less influenced by the SEEMP since they involve many stakeholders, which
makes their implementation rely heavily on the co-operation of many people and groups.

C. Assessment of Current Technical and Operational Measures
As the first ever mandatory and legally binding energy efficiency standards,105 the EEDI and
the SEEMP are the main technical and operational measures adopted by amendments to
Annex VI of the MARPOL Convention in July 2011. The adoption of these measures was a
breakthrough in the lengthy deadlock of the political negotiations on shipping GHG
emissions within the IMO and also confirmed the leading role of the IMO in regulating the
issue.106 According to an IMO assessment report, the combined EEDI and SEEMP will lead
to significant emission reductions.107 This reduction, if valued in terms of annual fuel cost
savings, will reach about US $50 billion in 2020 and get to US $200 billion by 2030.108
Meanwhile, the cost of EEDI compliance for an ‘average ship’ will not be significant,
although this cost will be higher in Phase 2 and 3 than in Phase 0 and 1 due to possible
investment on design-speed reduction.109 Therefore, the overall carbon dioxide reduction
resulting from the implementation of current technical and operational measures will be not
only ‘positive’ but also economically sound for the shipping industry.
Both the EEDI and the SEEMP highlight the importance of safe navigation of ships
while also improving the energy efficiency of shipping.110 The EEDI and SEEMP
requirements are linked to other IMO treaties on maritime safety and security, such as the
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1972 Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea.111 To
meet the safety requirements, a technological threshold is to be achieved by shipowners and
ship operators. Additionally, both the EEDI and the SEEMP provide a strong incentive for
the shipping industry to choose and update cost-efficient technologies to meet the criteria set
under the EEDI and the SEEMP. The shipping industry can freely choose the technologies
provided that they meet the requirements. This ‘freedom from prescription’ approach is vital
for the success of this mechanism on the ground that it was strongly supported by the global
shipping industry before it was adopted by the IMO.112 Since it is almost impossible to
implement these IMO instruments, including the technical and operational measures, without
compliance by the shipping industry, their active participation is essential.
Another example of these efforts is the negotiation on the possible approval of the
SEEMP by flag state administrations. During the sixtieth and sixty-first MEPC meetings,
many state delegations supported the proposal that the contents of the SEEMP should be
examined by the administration or organization recognized by the administration as a rule,113
while other state delegations and many industry representatives stressed that the SEEMP
should not be approved by the administration but may be audited as a part of the ship’s safety
management systems.114 Eventually, it was agreed that approval of the SEEMP by flag state
administrations would not be required. This was to a significant extent achieved by many
international shipping associations and could be deemed a victory of the shipping industry
against the flag states. Where the SEEMP of a ship needs to be approved by its flag state, it
will be often less efficient and more costly for the shipowners, whereas it may be beneficial
for flag states to better manage their ships. Moreover, in view of the current ‘flag of
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convenience’ problem,115 to rely the examination of a ship’s SEEMP on the audit of a ship’s
safety management system rather than on the approval of a flag state’s administration is also
beneficial for the reduction of GHG emissions from international shipping. This is because
many open registry states often do not have enough motive and expertise to organize this
examination of the SEEMP.
Despite the benefits of these technical and operational measures, some deficiencies
remain and impose challenges for the future implementation of these measures. As far as the
EEDI is concerned, it only applies to certain types of new ships (only covers 70 percent of
emissions from new ships), and existing ships are not, and technically will not be, covered by
the EEDI. This deficiency, if combined with the very lenient timetable as introduced in the
regulation and the projected growth in international trade, would reduce to a significant
extent the effectiveness of the EEDI. Additionally, future regulation for the remaining types
of new ships may adopt different energy efficiency standards, which would increase the
difficulty of effective enforcement. With respect to the MARPOL Convention,
implementation mainly relies on flag states and port states. The IMO sets energy efficiency
standards itself through Annex VI of the MARPOL Convention. However, the authority it
gives to port states is limited. The added paragraph 5 of Regulation 10 of Annex VI provides
that ‘[i]n relation to chapter 4, any port State inspection shall be limited to verifying, when
appropriate, that there is a valid International Energy Efficiency Certificate on board, in
accordance with article 5 of the Convention.’116
Through this regulation, the IMO attempts to exclude unilateral actions by port states
in dealing with shipping GHG emissions. Nevertheless, it will be beneficial for the global
reduction of GHG emissions from ships if some states take further steps in this regard. It is
also believed that potential regulatory competition between different institutions will provide
a significant motivation for the IMO to facilitate its work.117 An example of unilateral action
is the inclusion of the emissions from the international aviation industry into the emission
trading scheme of the EU. Although this initiative has been suspended due to opposition from
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various developed and developing countries,118 it has motivated to some extent the efforts of
the ICAO in accelerating its work under the Kyoto Protocol.119
The SEEMP is introduced as representing a reduction measure for existing and new
ships. Basically, it is a management scheme that entails no reduction requirement at all. To a
significant extent, the lack of reduction target setting and monitoring reduces the
effectiveness of the SEEMP.120 This deficiency needs to be rectified by means of other
incentives to be provided.121 It is also recommended by an IMO assessment report that EEOI
should be encouraged or mandated as a performance indicator for the SEEMP rather than
remain as a voluntary provision.122
Another challenge comes from the future enforcement of these measures by
developing countries that opposed the adoption of the measures. Regulation 23 of Annex VI
to the MARPOL Convention underscores the promotion of technical co-operation and
transfer of technology, aiming to strengthen the capacity building of developing countries.
This mechanism, if well designed, could be regarded as a kind of differentiated treatment.
Since common responsibility and differentiated responsibility are two core elements of the
CBDR principle, and common responsibility has been incorporated in this context via the
NMFT principle,123 the proper design and implementation of the technical co-operation and
transfer of technology elements of this mechanism might constitute the application of the
CBDR principle. However, Regulation 23 lacks ‘concrete obligations’ on any state124 and
stipulates that this technical co-operation is subject to national laws, regulations, and
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policies.125 It is expected that the transfer of technology from developed countries to
developing countries will not be straightforward due to various domestic regulations on
intellectual property protection in developed countries.126 In developed countries, most
energy-efficient technologies are owned by private shipping companies. Therefore, how to
achieve the successful transfer of technologies in a cost-effective manner remains a difficult
question.
Figure 1 is one scenario devised by a recent IMO Assessment Study on Energy
Efficiency Measures.127 The figure shows that based on the 2010 carbon dioxide emissions
level, it is almost impossible to achieve absolute emission reduction from 2010 to 2050 using
the EEDI and SEEMP alone. This is because new emissions produced by increased world
trade outweigh the emissions reductions achieved by these two measures. For all scenarios,
this conclusion is the same. Therefore, in addition to technical and operational measures
already adopted by Annex VI of the MARPOL Convention, the international community has
turned to MBMs to explore their utility in the possible reduction of GHG emissions from
international shipping.

Figure 1. Annual Emission Reduction by 2050 and New Emissions Levels (scenario A1B-4)
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Source: Zabi Bazari and Tore Longva, Assessment of IMO Mandated Energy Efficiency Measures for
International Shipping, Doc MEPC 63/INF.2 (31 October 2011), Annex at 5.

4. MBMs
MBMs, which are also referred to as market-based instruments or market-based mechanisms,
are generally regarded as an important supplement to the technical and operational measures
already in place in reducing GHG emissions from international shipping. In accordance with
the polluter pays principle, MBMs aim to provide the polluters (shipowners and ship
operators) with an economic incentive to reduce their GHG emissions.128 As a comparatively
new concept in the shipping context, MBMs have been controversial since they were
formally put forward in the 2000 IMO GHG study. The IMO has endeavoured to promote the
awareness of MBMs by relevant stakeholders of the GHG issue. As a follow up to the 2000
GHG study commissioned by the IMO, the Scientific Study on International Shipping and
Market-Based Instruments (Scientific Study) was published in December 2009.129 In August
2010, another IMO-commissioned report undertaken by the Expert Group on Feasibility
Study and Impact Assessment of Possible Market-based Measures (Expert Group) was
released, the Full Report of the Work Undertaken by the Expert Group on Feasibility Study
and Impact Assessment of Possible Market-based Measures (Feasibility Study and Impact
Assessment Report).130 Currently, a report commissioned by the IMO on possible impacts on
consumers and industries in developing countries is under way and is expected to be finalized
at the sixty-sixth MEPC meeting in 2014. Through this work, most countries have come to
accept MBMs, and seven main types of proposals have been submitted to the IMO for future
discussion, although some countries still oppose the adoption of any MBM.131 This following
sections explore the necessity for adopting MBMs and then provide a feasibility and impact
assessment of current MBM options.
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A. The Necessity of MBMs in Reducing Shipping GHG Emissions
In economics theory, the emergence of MBMs has been interpreted as an approach to
overcome the problem of environmental externalities.132 MBMs are one of the main types of
environmental policies,133 and they have been employed by many countries to regulate
adverse environmental impacts resulting from anthropogenic activities. As defined by the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
[MBMs] seek to address the market failure of ‘environmental externalities’ either by incorporating the
external cost of production or consumption activities through taxes or charges on processes or
products, or by creating property rights and facilitating the establishment of a proxy market for the use
of environmental services.134

MBMs can be classified into three groups, namely environmental fees (contribution), tradable
permit (allowance) schemes, and liability rules.135 Nevertheless, there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’
MBM. In practice, different MBMs provide solutions for different problems, and some issues
might need a mix of two or three types of MBMs.
In the context of GHG emissions from shipping, MBMs can be designed to internalize
the external cost of GHG emissions from international shipping by means of a GHG fund or
different emission trading schemes. However, the first step is to decide whether MBMs are
needed for the reduction of GHG emissions from international shipping. It is a difficult
question. Many developing countries, in particular China, India, and Brazil, oppose the
adoption of any MBMs. Their argument has mainly been underpinned by three reasons. One
is the uncertainty associated with MBMs, including those of the carbon market, the
calculation of the emissions from international shipping, and the effect of a carbon tax on
ships on the export industry as well as on the future development of the shipping industry and
132
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world trade.136 Another reason lies in the fundamental inadequacies both in theory and in
principle. Developing countries argue that the implementation of current MBM proposals
requires several prerequisites so as to avert the distortion of competition, such as the same or
similar level of economic and technological development realized among all participating
countries, some convergence of political power, and the deployment of a common central
institution.137
They also assert that the NMFT principle incorporated in the majority of current
MBM proposals ignores historical responsibility and is a disadvantage for developing
countries.138 Moreover, some of the proposed MBMs are regarded by some developing
countries as being likely to violate WTO rules.139 For instance, the MBM on Port State Levy
proposed by Jamaica envisages levying a globally uniform emissions charge on all vessels
calling at their respective ports, based on the amount of pollution produced by the vessel
during the voyage (see Table 2). This proposal measures the amount of pollution by the
amount of fuels consumed, which due to different ship types and operational methods may
not be accurate. In this case, it actually leads to differentiated treatment of different ships,
which might possibly contravene the general most-favoured-nation treatment as incorporated
in Article I of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.140
In contrast to developing countries, most developed countries and NGOs are in favour
of certain types of MBMs and have actually submitted their proposals to the IMO, although
they disagree with each other on what type of MBM is best. The reason is simple—the
current EEDI and SEEMP are not sufficient for effective reduction of GHG emissions from
international shipping due to the projected growth of international seaborne trade, and, thus,
specific types of MBMs are needed to supplement the energy-efficiency measures.
While intensive discussions on MBMs have been held within the IMO, it is predicted
that a form of MBM will be adopted in the near future by the IMO or other international
institutions to reduce emissions from ships. First, as discussed earlier, to achieve absolute
emission reduction using EEDI and SEEMP alone is not possible in practice, which has been
136

Uncertainties and Problems in Market-based Measures, submitted by China and India,
MEPC 61st Session, Agenda Item 5, Doc MEPC 61/5/24 (5 August 2010) at 2.
137
Ibid at 3.
138
Ibid; Market-based Measures: Inequitable Burden on Developing Countries, submitted by
India, MEPC 61st Session, Agenda Item 5, Doc MEPC 61/5/19 (2 August 2010) at 3.
139
See, eg, Possible Incompatibility between the WTO Rules and Market-based Measures for
International Shipping, submitted by India and Saudi Arabia, MEPC 64th Session,
Agenda Item 5, Doc MEPC 64/5/3 (29 June 2012).
140
Ibid at para 25. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 55 UNTS 194.
31

proven by a number of scenario modellings, revealed in many assessment reports.141
Moreover, the EEDI and SEEMP regulations only entered into force on 1 January 2013, so in
practice their compliance by various states and their emissions reduction potential cannot be
identified in the short term. The shipping industry has recognized the deficiencies of these
measures and relevant work on their improvement has been conducted within the IMO.
However, given the intricacies of ship types and shipping features, a technical breakthrough
is hardly likely to be achieved soon. Currently, global emissions are ‘considerably higher’
than the level consistent with the 2 degree Celcius target in 2020, and this trend continues.142
Under the circumstances, it is necessary for the international shipping industry to explore and
discuss the possibility of adopting MBMs for more GHG reduction rather than waiting for the
effects of applying energy-efficiency measures to be practically identified.
Second, it is technically possible to incorporate the CBDR principle into a future
MBM, and proposals applying the principle have been submitted to the IMO by different
countries and NGOs.143 As shown in the comments by some developing countries, the core
debate within the MEPC lies in the ignorance of the CBDR principle reflected in many MBM
proposals. Once this problem is resolved, it may be possible to adopt MBMs that are accepted
by most countries. It seems that any MBM proposal that ignores the CBDR principle would
be hardly feasible on the ground that the CBDR principle in the shipping context has been
supported by ‘the majority of delegations’ within the MEPC.144 In recent years, some
international shipping organizations, as well as the shipowners’ associations in states listed in
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Annex I to the UNFCCC, also came to accept the incorporation of the CBDR principle into a
proposed MBM.145
The possible adoption of MBMs could reduce shipping GHG emissions in two
respects: in-sector reduction and out-of-sector reduction.146 In the first case, a MBM may
provide an economic incentive (for example, a charge on fuel, a refund to ‘good performance
ships’) for the shipping industry to reduce its fuel consumption. The industry might invest in
more fuel efficient ships or technologies or operate ships in a more energy-efficient manner.
In the second case, the money collected from a MBM could be utilized to reduce GHG
emissions outside the marine sector. In this way, growing shipping emissions could be offset
by emission reduction in other sectors.

B. The Feasibility and Impact Assessment of MBM Options
In order to adopt a MBM for the reduction of GHG emissions from international shipping, it
is important to know what choices exist and whether they will have adverse impacts on the
shipping industry and different countries, in particular, developing countries. Based on these
analyses, the selection and adoption of a suitable MBM is possible. Currently, there are seven
types of MBM proposals being discussed and debated within the IMO. A brief introduction
of these proposals is illustrated in Table 2. To simplify future assessments and facilitate the
decision-making process of the MEPC, intensive debate on the grouping of these proposals
was held at the third GHG-WG meeting. It was concluded that MBM proposals should be
grouped into two categories, the first one focused on in-sector reduction and the second one
145
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focused on in-sector and out-of-sector reduction, as indicated in Table 2.147 This grouping is
based on the areas in which the reduction of GHG emissions from ships will mainly take
place and has received many comments on their strengths and weaknesses from different
delegations.148 This section divides these MBM options into three groups. They are
environmental fee-related MBM proposals, tradable permit scheme-related MBM proposals,
and hybrid MBM proposals.

Table 2. Seven Types of MBM Proposals Submitted to the IMO (as of May 2013)
MBM proposals

Proponents

Working mechanisms / Grouping of

Base documents

emission reduction
Cyprus, Denmark,

Establishes a global reduction target for

the Marshall

international shipping, set by either the

Islands, Nigeria,

UNFCCC or the IMO. Emissions above the

MEPC 59/4/5,

and the

target line would be offset largely by

MEPC

International

purchasing approved emission reduction

60/4/8,

Parcel Tankers

credits. The offsetting activities would be

GHG-WG 3/2/1,

Association

financed by a contribution paid by ships on

GHG-WG 3/3/4

(IPTA)

every tonne of bunker fuel purchased
(Grouping: In-Sector and Out-of-Sector)

GHG Fund

Establishes a speed-related GHG or
compensation fund to include regulated slow
steaming in the design and impact assessment
of any MBM proposals. It set average target
Clean Shipping

speeds for different types and sizes of ships

MEPC 64/5/8,

Coalition (CSC)

in order to meet the agreed emissions

MEPC 64/INF.14

reduction target set by the IMO for an MBM.
Additional speed levy or contribution would
be payable for ships having higher average
speeds. Revenues could be used to purchase
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offsets.
(Grouping: Focus on In-Sector)

Levies a uniform emissions charge on all
vessels calling at their respective ports based
on the amount of fuel consumed by the

Port State Levy

Jamaica

(PSL)

respective vessel on its voyage to that port.

MEPC 60/4/40,

The CBDR principle could be achieved

MEPC 64/5/4

through a self-administered fund and/or some
international mechanism (Grouping: ‘Focus
on In-Sector’ and ‘In-Sector & Out-ofSector’)
All new ships, except for those that meet preset EEDI thresholds and existing ships, are
required to make payment contributions

MEPC 60/4/37,

Efficiency

Japan and World

based on the amount of the bunker fuel

MEPC 60/4/39,

Incentive Scheme

Shipping Council

consumed/purchased and the degree to which

GHG-WG 3/3/2,

(EIS)

(WSC)

the ship’s efficiency falls short of a specific

MEPC 63/5/3,

standard. Funds collected go to an

MEPC 64/5/2,

International GHG Fund for further

MEPC 64/INF.15

allocation (Grouping: Focus on In-Sector)

Ship Efficiency
and Credit

United Sates

Trading (SECT)

Subjects all ships to mandatory energy-

MEPC 60/4/12,

efficiency standards. As one means of

MEPC 61/5/16,

complying with the standard, an efficiency

MEPC 61/IMF.24

credit trading program would be established.
These standards would become more
stringent over time (Grouping: Focus on InSector)
Sets a sector-wide cap on net emissions from
international shipping. A number of

Global Emissions

Norway

allowances (ship emission units)

(later added as co-

corresponding to the cap would be released

MEPC 60/4/22;

sponsor, Germany)

into the market each year via a global

MEPC 60/4/26;

auctioning process. The units could then be

MEPC 60/4/41;
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Trading System

traded.

MEPC 60/4/54;

(ETS) for

Differs from the Norwegian ETS proposal in

GHG-WG 3/3/5;

international

two aspects: the method of allocating

GHG-WG 3/3/6;

emissions allowances (national instead of

GHG-WG 3/3/8

shipping

United Kingdom

global auctioning) and the approach for
setting the emissions cap (set with a longterm declining trajectory).
Sets out additional details on auction design
France

under a shipping ETS. In all other aspects,
the proposal is similar to the Norwegian ETS
proposal.

(Grouping: In-Sector & Out-of-Sector)
The imposition of any costs should be
proportionate to the contribution by
Penalty on trade
and development

Bahamas

international shipping to global carbon

MEPC 60/4/10,

dioxide emissions. The reduction will apply

GHG-WG 3/2

to individual ships and not member states,
and developing states will not be faced with a
penalty upon trade and development
(Grouping: Focus on In-Sector)
Compensate developing countries for the
financial impact of a MBM. It could be either
Rebate

applied to any maritime MBM that generates

MEPC 60/4/55,

mechanism for a

revenue (add-on option) or integrated with

MEPC 61/5/33;

market-based

IUCN (WWF

the International Maritime Emission

MEPC 64/5/10,

instrument for

provides add-on

Reduction Scheme (integrated option)

MEPC 64/5/12

international

options)

(Grouping: ‘Focus on In-Sector’ and ‘In-

shipping

Sector & Out-of-Sector’ (add-on); In-Sector
and Out-of-Sector (integrated))

Source: The information in this table comes from the following texts: IMO, Main Events in IMO’s Work on
Limitation and Reduction of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International Shipping (2011)
<http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/resources/Pages/Greenhouse%20gas%20emissions.aspx>; Report of the
Third Intersessional Meeting of the Working Group on Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships, Note by the
Secretariat, MEPC 62nd Session, Agenda Item 5, Doc MEPC 62/5/1 (8 April 2011) Annex 2.

i. Environmental fee-related MBM proposals
The GHG Fund, Port State Levy, and Penalty on Trade and Development are types of
environmental fee-related MBM proposals. They provide the polluter with an incentive to
reduce GHG emissions in order to pay less fees. Among the three proposals, the GHG Fund
has received the most international attention. The Scientific Study on International Shipping
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and Market-Based Instruments asserts that all emissions covered by the GHG Fund will raise
revenue for a central governing body, and the amount depends on the carbon price per tonne
of carbon dioxide and on the amount of emissions.149 The higher carbon price generally
indicates more reduction of carbon dioxide emissions.150 In this case, the carbon price, or the
‘contribution,’ is actually a levy on fuel since it has to be imposed on ships if these MBMs
apply.151 In this way, the shipping GHG emissions could be reduced, and the revenues raised
could be utilized to either compensate developing countries or reduce out-of-sector emissions
through purchasing ‘offsets.’ Nevertheless, the utilization of revenues for reducing out-ofsector GHG emissions does not indicate that in-sector emission reduction is less significant.
Rather, it is because the in-sector reduction can be achieved through the collection of a
contribution or levy.152 Since shipowners generally respond to prices quickly, this proposal
seems feasible and easy to implement.153 The main concern about this proposal lies in its
dealing with revenue and how the special conditions of developing countries are taken into
account. There might be another concern about the increased cost, including the extra
administrative burden, associated with the GHG Fund proposal. The Feasibility Study and
Impact Assessment Report, undertaken by the Expert Group and commissioned by the IMO,
provides a comprehensive assessment of proposed MBMs. This report reveals that the
increased cost for the GHG Fund is the lowest among the current MBM proposals except for
the Penalty on Trade and Development proposed by the Bahamas.154
The Port State Levy proposed by Jamaica levies a uniform emissions charge on all
vessels calling at ports, based on the amount of fuel consumed by the vessels on their voyage
to that port. Technically, this option can be easily implemented and is consistent with the
polluter pays principle due to its inclusion of all emissions produced by the ship during that
journey. However, as mentioned earlier, this option might neither be accurate nor fair for all
ships since it measures the ship’s actual emissions solely by the fuels that have been
consumed. This measurement ignores other pertinent parameters and, thus, is not conducted
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in a ‘cost-effective’ manner.155 Meanwhile, since port states play a crucial role in the
enforcement of this MBM, it is important to ensure that all port states, including those that
choose not to participate in the system and those that lack proper monitoring and enforcement
mechanisms, collaborate in implementing it.156 Otherwise, some ships may opt for routes
through ports that lack monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to avoid the levy. This may
lead to competitive distortion, distortion in trade flows, and a non-level playing field among
shipping companies and ports. Additionally, under this scheme, the increased cost option is
estimated to be the highest among current MBM options.157 At the sixty-fourth MEPC
meeting, the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) announced that its preferred MBM is a
levy or compensation fund-based system and should directly relate to the actual fuel
consumption of individual ships in service.158 This preference has also been followed by the
shipping industries in some countries such as Greece and Korea.159
The penalty on trade and development proposal by the Bahamas aims to reduce
shipping GHG emissions through the imposition of a penalty (cost) and insists that such costs
should be proportionate to the GHG emissions from international shipping. To achieve this
goal, it seeks to collect emission statistics from either the EEOI or ship funnels using a
suitable sensor. According to the proposal, the ship is required to submit data to its flag state
or recognized organization for annual verification. Under this scheme, no extra cost would be
generated, but the main problem is that the EEOI is not available for all types of ships, and,
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currently, EEOI baselines are also ‘impossible’ to establish.160 The application of this
proposal to the GHG issue will not be feasible if this problem cannot be resolved.
ii. Tradable permit scheme-related MBM proposals
Among the seven types of MBM proposals, the three types of global emissions trading
systems (ETS) for international shipping submitted by Norway, the United Kingdom, and
France are tradable permit scheme-related MBM proposals. The ETS mechanism was first
regulated by the Kyoto Protocol and is currently utilized in the EU. As the world’s largest
company-level ‘cap-and-trade’ system, the EU ETS scheme has applied since 1 January
2005. As of 14 November 2012, all twenty-seven EU member states and three other
European countries have participated in the scheme.161 Currently, there are only minor
differences between the three ETS proposals for international shipping. Compared to the
Norwegian ETS, the proposal by the United Kingdom has a different method of allocating
emissions allowances and a different approach to setting the emissions cap, while the French
proposal provides details on auction design. The main strength in relation to these ETSs lies
in their higher certainty of carbon dioxide reduction. Although no international ETS has been
implemented, a regional EU ETS might provide a ‘prototype’ from which international
shipping can learn.162
There are significant challenges in implementing these ETS proposals for
international shipping. First, significant carbon leakage and distortion of competition risks
exist under the current ETS proposals. Carbon leakage generally refers to differentiated
carbon policies and their subsequent impacts on GHG emissions.163 Since carbon leakage
might hinder the success of a global GHG emissions reduction and thus distort global
competition, it is important for the ETS to be applied to the international transportation
sector, including international aviation, rather than solely to the shipping industry or even
part of the shipping industry.164 The Norwegian ETS provides two exemptions from applying
the scheme, namely ships below certain sizes and ships on international voyages to small
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island developing states (SIDS).165 While it is a common practice within the IMO regime to
set a threshold for ship size, the design of the voyage exemption was to meet the needs of
developing countries. However, this regulation may also make it possible for some
shipowners or ship operators to opt for certain ship sizes or certain shipping routes through
the SIDS in order to get emission exemptions. In this case, competition will be distorted, and
the reduction goal may also be hard to achieve. Second, compared with the GHG Fund
proposal, an ETS incurs much higher administrative costs to track, monitor, and enforce as
well as to avoid evasion and fraud. Last but not least, the current situation, in relation to the
EU ETS generally, provides more uncertainty for the future development of an ETS for
international shipping. As discussed earlier, the inclusion of the emissions from the
international aviation industry into the EU ETS was suspended in December 2012, which, to
some extent, makes the ETS less attractive for the shipping industry. Currently, international
shipping organizations are generally against an ETS, whereas the shipping associations in
some of the Annex I states to the UNFCCC support it.166

iii. Hybrid MBM proposals

Of the seven types of MBM proposals, the Efficiency Incentive Scheme, Ship Efficiency and
Credit Trading, and Rebate Mechanism belong to the category of hybrid MBM proposals.
The Efficiency Incentive Scheme and Ship Efficiency and Credit Trading can be regarded as
hybrid MBMs with the EEDI as a benchmark, whereas the Rebate Mechanism is a hybrid
MBM that can be built into any other MBM. One common feature between the Efficiency
Incentive Scheme and Ship Efficiency and Credit Trading is that they both reward good
performance ships in their own way, and the EEDI is used for measurement. However, it is
the EEDI that makes the two hybrid MBM proposals less attractive. Two factors contribute to
this argument. First, low EEDI indicates high energy efficiency, whereas a ship with a low
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EEDI does not necessarily mean that it has the lowest GHG emissions.167 Its emissions might
be more than those from a ship with a larger engine (high EEDI), which it needs to maintain
certain speed to ensure safety in bad weather.168 In this case, the EEDI measurement does not
work well. Second, the two hybrid MBM proposals, if adopted, will apply to both new ships
and existing ships, whereas the EEDI adopted by Annex VI to the MARPOL Convention
applies to new ships only.169 To date, there has been no research indicating the possible
application of the EEDI to existing ships. After testing and verification, the International
Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners asserts that the EEDI ‘does not apply to, and hence it
cannot and should not be used for, existing ships.’170 Therefore, the adoption of these hybrid
MBM proposals is not straightforward.
The Rebate Mechanism consists of two options: an add-on option by integrating with
any revenue-raising MBM and an integrated option incorporated with the International
Maritime Emission Reduction Scheme, which is a levy-on-fuel scheme. The main feature of
this hybrid MBM is its compatibility with the CBDR principle. Under the add-on option, all
ships pay for their emissions. However, a developing country obtains an annual rebate based
on its share of global seaborne imports first, and then the remaining revenue from developed
countries will be disbursed through the UNFCCC. In this way, the ‘no net incidence’ on
developing countries can be ensured.171 In other words, developing countries will not suffer
any loss, but they will benefit from participating in the Rebate Mechanism. The first draft of
the legal text for the Rebate Mechanism was submitted to the sixty-fourth MEPC meeting by
the World Wide Fund for Nature in October 2012, and it stipulates that ‘each Party not
included in annex II of the UNFCCC, or any successor annex, shall be eligible to an
apportioned rebate [from a potential MBM Convention],’ and this rebate could be foregone as
its contribution to international co-operation.172 This proposed regulation expands the scope
of the beneficiaries of this scheme from SIDS and least developed countries as proposed by
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some countries to all non-Annex II states to the UNFCCC. It is expected that this mechanism
will be attractive for developing countries due to its incorporation of the CBDR principle.
Compared with other proposals, this proposal better reflects the interests of both developing
countries and developed countries. Nevertheless, if the add-on option is built into any other
MBM proposal, such as a GHG Fund or ETS, the administrative costs will probably be
higher due to the possible increased number of administrative bodies. Therefore, it will be
very challenging to control these costs. Furthermore, in terms of calculating a developing
country’s share of global imports by value, whether the available data are accurate and
reliable, is another concern.
IV. CONCLUSION

It has been a challenge for the international community to provide globally uniform
regulations for reducing GHG emissions from international shipping that are acceptable to
both developing countries and developed countries. Since the IMO has been mandated to
regulate GHG emissions from international shipping, the challenge becomes whether both the
CBDR and the NMFT principles can and should be applied to the issue under discussion.
From an international law perspective, the IMO Convention and UNCLOS provide the IMO
with general competence to regulate the GHG issue, while the Kyoto Protocol provides the
IMO with a specific mandate to regulate this matter. These competences make it possible for
the IMO to apply both principles in addressing GHG emissions from ships.
Recently, after a long-term deadlock, the IMO has partially regulated the GHG
emissions by adopting mandatory technical and operational measures in its amendment of
Annex VI to the MARPOL Convention. This regulation ensures significant emissions
reduction and provides a strong incentive for the shipping industry to update cost-efficient
technologies. However, the limited EEDI coverage and the lack of a SEEMP reduction target
need to be addressed. In particular, the lack of full incorporation of the CBDR principle
makes the future enforcement of this regulation questionable particularly for developing
country fleets.
In furtherance of reducing GHG emissions from ships, the IMO has organized various
discussions and negotiations on potential MBMs. Of the current seven types of MBMs
proposed to the IMO, each of them has its pros and cons. Generally, the GHG Fund has low
administrative costs and has been welcomed by most of the shipping industry, whereas the
Rebate Mechanism serves as the only MBM that properly incorporates the CBDR principle.
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As a widely discussed option, an ETS has been opposed by the global shipping industry, but
it has been supported by the shipping industry in some of the UNFCCC Annex I states.
However, as all of these proposals are still under further development, it is important to
ensure that the MBMs to be adopted should be cost-effective and take the interests of
developing countries into account.
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